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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GARY WOOD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

DARRELL L. TAYLOR,
Defendant and Appellant

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The general framework of Appellant's statement
of facts is correct as far as it goes, but there are many
important omissions, particularly omissions regarding
events occurring immediately preceding the collision in
which the Respondent sustained his injuries. For this
reason the facts concerning these events are restated
so that one complete picture may be presented.
The eye-witness's testimony concerning the collision
comes primarily from Karen Wright, who was riding
in the front seat of the automobile operated by the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant. She testified that shortly before reaching
the town of Ovid, where the car made a 90° turn, that
she asked the Appellant to slow down, and the Appellant
replied as follows : "You're nervous, aren't you?" Witness said, "Yes," and the Appellant then said, "How
many times do you think I've driven this road f" (112).
Further evidence of :Miss Wright's concern over the
manner in which Appellant was operating his automobile and his disregard to her warnings to him is
apparent by the statements she made to one of the
persons who removed her from the overturned car.
Witness Larry J aussi testified as follows: "I heard
Miss Wright when we got her out from under the carshe says, 'I told hiln to slow down, but he wouldn't listen
to me.' " (86) Miss Wright also testified that shortly
following her warning to the Appellant, that the automobile rounded a sharp curve in Ovid, which was about
three miles north of the scene of the collision, that as
the Appellant rounded this curve he had to apply his
brakes, and that the car left the oiled portion of the
road and went out onto the gravel at the side of the
road (111).
After rounding the curve at Ovid, :Miss \Yrig:1t
observed the speedometer to indicate a speed of 70 MPH,
and she stated that she was apprehensive and nervous
about the manner in which the auton1obile was being
operated (112-113).
About two city blocks ahead of Appellant's car
Miss Wright observed the tractor pulling the hay-rack
c01ne onto the highway. She thought the Appellant
also observed the tractor and hay-rack, but when she
C)
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noticed the Appellant was maintaining the same high
rate of speed, she screamed, "Look out!", and then
the car crashed into the hay-rack (114).
Other evidence in regard to the collision comes from
Sheriff :Monson, who was the investigating Officer, and
who testified that the impact apparently came on the
right rear corner of the hay-rack, and that the Appellant's car then proceeded forward under the hay-rack
(14, 74). The Sheriff further stated that there was no
indication that the Appellant applied his brakes or laid
down any skid marks prior to the impact (14). Following the impact, the evidence indicates that the Appellant's car overturned several times in the air ( 84) and
then came to rest 235 feet 7 inches from where the
rear end of the hay-rack stopped (48). There is evidence
that the tractor and the hay-rack stopped almost immediately upon impact (84).
Deputy Sheriff Ramey, who assisted Sheriff ~Ion
son in the investigation, testified that a car approaching
the scene of the collision from the direction Appellant
was travelling would have an unobstructed view ahead
for thirty-five hundreths of a mile (76, 77), that an
object such as a tractor and a hay-rack could be observed
for fifty-five one hundreths of a mile back from the
point of where the collision occurred (78). Deputy
Ramey further testified that the hay-rack and the tractor
did not obstruct the left half of the highway at the time
of the impact as contended by Appellant in his statement
of facts (74, 75, 76).
To briefly summarize the foregoing testimony of
the witnesses and the physical evidence, the following
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evidence exists: The. tractor and the hay-rack pulled
onto the highway from a farm lane to the west of the
highway and were travelling at a speed of from 4 to
5 MPH, at a time when the Appellant was about two
city blocks to the North. At that tiine the Appellant
had a clear view of the tractor and the hay-rack with
no obstruction of any kind between his car and the
hay-rack. Appellant continued his speed of approximately 70 MPH without application of brakes sufficient
to make brake marks, skid marks, or any other evidence
on the highway of attempting to slow down the automobile. The Appellant apparently continued his speed
right up to the point where he came to the hay-rack,
and then he attempted to pass the tractor and the hayrack by turning out onto the narrow shoulder on the
right-hand side of the roadway, although the evidence
is clear that the left half of the roadway was unobstructed at that time. As Appellant attempted to pass the
hay-rack, he struck its right rear quarter, passed under
the right side of the hay-rack, left the highway, overturned in the air several ti1nes, and his automobile came
to rest in the barrow pit upsidedown 235 feet dmvn the
road.
STATE~IENT

OF POINTS
POINT I

THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE
FINDING OF THE JURY THAT THE APPELLANT
WAS GUILTY OF A "RECI{LESS DISREGARD" OF
THE RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENT.
POINT II
IT IS PRESU~IED THAT THE JFRY OBEYED
4
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THE INSTRUCTION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO
DISREGARD THE REl\fARE:S TO WHICH APPELLANT TOOK EXCEPTION, AND IT WAS A PROPER
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION FOR THE
TRIAL COURT TO DENY MISTRIAL.
THE
MOTION
MOTION
DENIED

POINT III
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS,
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT, AND
FOR A NEW TRIAL WERE PROPERLY
BY THE TRIAL COURT.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
THE VETERANS AD~fiNISTRATION WAS NOT
A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST AND NEED NOT
BE NAl\fED AS A PARTY PLAINTIFF.
POINT V
IT WAS ENTIRELY PROPER FOR THE TRIAL
COURT TO ADl\fiT EVIDENCE RELATING TO RESPONDENT'S OBLIGATION, IN THE EVENT OF
HIS RECOVERY FROM THE APPELLANT, TO
PAY THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION FOR
MEDICAL SERVICES RENDERED HIM IN THE
VETERANS HOSPITAL.
POINT VI
CONSIDERING THE PERl\fANENT NATURE
OF THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY RESPONDENT,
THE DAl\fAGES AWARDED ARE NOT EXCESSIVE, AND THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED
EVIDENCE OF THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION HOSPITAL BILL.
5
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POINT VII
POLICE OFFICER ALVIN W. FOULGER WAS
PROPERLY QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT WITNESS, AND HIS EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS ENTIRELY MATERIAL AND RELEVANT TO THE
ISSUES OF THE CASE.
POINT VIII
THE COURT'S INSTRL"CTIONS TO THE JURY
PROVIDED THE JURY WITH A FAIR AND
LEGALLY CORRECT BASIS FOR CONSIDERING
AND DELIBERATING UPON ALL ISSUES OF THE
CASE.
ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE
FINDING OF THE JURY THAT THE APPELLANT
WAS GUILTY OF A "RECKLESS DISREGARD"
OF THE RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDE~T.
Respondent concedes that he was obligated to meet
the requiren1ents of the Idaho Code, and further that
the Idaho Guest Statute is the law which is applicable
to this case. Respondent further admits that the only
portion of the Idaho Statute with which we are concerned here is whether or not the conduct of the appellant amounted to .. reckless disregard". Appellant has
called the attention of the court to the definitions of the
Idaho Guest Statute as set forth in Foberg vs. Harrison,
71 Ida. 11, ~~5 P. 2d 69, (1950), and ~llason vs ..Mootz,
73 Ida. 461, 253 P. 2d ~40, (1953) Respondent feels
that the following definitions fr01n Dazcson rs. Salt Lake
6
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Hardware Co., 64 Ida. 666 at page 667, 136 P. 2d 733
at page 738, as quoted with approval in Hughes vs.
Hudelson, 67 Ida. 10, 169 P. 2d 712, (1946), further
explains the interpretation placed upon the Idaho Guest
Statute by the Idaho Supreme Court, wherein the court
stated as follows at pages 716 and 717:

"It is evident, to my mind, that the Legislature by the Ut;e of the word 'reckles:::;', following the word 'intentional', meant to hold the driver
liable for a lesser degree of negligence than an
'intentional' act. A driver may accomplish the
same result, ho\vever~ by driving in a manner or
at a speed that is dangerous (reckless). and yet do
so with no special purpo,;;e to injure his guest or
himself or intent other than to be going wherever
or however he pleases, regardless of results.
The word 'reckless' as used in this Statute
is, in my opinion, not used as synonomous with
'a conscious indifference', 'willful disregard', or
'wanton disregard' of the rights of a guest."
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Shoemaker
vs. Floor, 117 Utah 434, 217 P. 2d 382, at page 384, sets
forth the basis on which an Idaho guest action must
be considered when heard in Utah :
"The principal question, therefore, is whether
or not the conduct of the defendant as testified
to by the plaintiff, may be found by the trier of
the facts, to constitute 'reckless disregard', of the
safety of the plaintiff within the means of the
Idaho Guest Statute, Cases from several jurisdictions having similarly worded Statutes are
cited by appellant and respondent in support of
their respective positions. However, since the
court is applying the Statuatory Law of Idaho,
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we must give to such law construction placed
thereon by the Supreme Court of that f;tate if
such construction has been made. Appellant's
contention that 'reckless disregard of the rights
of others' is equivalent to 'wilful misconduct' as
used in the Utah Guest Statute, in our opinion
has been rejected by the Idaho Court."
In discussing the facts of the Shoemaker case as
applied to the Idaho Law, the Utah Court says on page
386:
"While in several jurisdictions with statutes
similar in wording to that of Idaho, Defendant
might have been entitled to a nonsuit under the
stated facts, the two cited cases from Idaho,
(Hughes vs. Hudelson, supra, and Dau·son vs.
Salt Lake Hardware Co., 64 Ida. 666, 130 P. 2d,
733) convinces us that the question of 'reckless
disregard for the safety' of the Plaintiff W[).S for
the trier of the facts." (parenthesis ours)
Appellant cites a New ~Iexico case in his brief,
and even though the New :Mexico and the Idaho Guest
Statutes may be very similar, the Utah Supreme Court
has clearly adopted the position that the interpretation
to be placed on the Idaho Statute is the one placed by
the Idaho Supreme Court, and not that placed by the
courts of other states having similar statutes. However, it should also be pointed out that there is one important distinguishing feature between the Kew :Mexico
case and the instant case. The New :Mexico case occurred
at night, wherein the instant case occurred in broad
daylight.
Appellant appears to place great reliance upon the
8
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Idaho case of Turner vs. Purdem, 77 Ida. 130, 289 P. 2d
608, ( 1955).
The fact situation in the Turner case was as follows: At about 9:30 P. M. in the month of October,
Turner was riding in an automobile driven by Purdem,
which was travelling at a speed of 45 to 50 MPH. At
the same time one Dye was driving a farm tractor towing
a potato-digger in the same direction that the Purdem
car was travelling. The tractor had a white light 4~
in. diameter located so that it shone slightly downward
but at a level above the potato digger. There were no
yellow or red lights, or reflectors on the rear of the
tractor, nor lights or reflectors of any kind on the rear
of the potato digger. When Purdem was one-half mile
behind the potato digger he saw the white light, and he
testified that he did not see the light any more until
he was within 25 or 30 feet of the digger; at this time
he did not have time to apply his brakes to avoid colliding with the potato digger and injuring Turner.
In the Turner case the trial court granted Purdem
a non-suit. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court. The facts of the Turner
case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the
instant case in almost every important particular.
First: The Turner collision took place at night
under windy and somewhat dusty conditions.
Second: Neither the tractor nor the potato digger
was equipped with red lights or red reflectors, the only
visible light being a white light on the tractor that was
pointing downward.
9
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In the case now before the Court, the collision took
place on a dry road, on a clear, bright day with no obstructions of any kind to appellant's vision. Testimony
in the instant case further shows that Karen Wright,
the person sitting next to the appellant, saw the tractor
and hay-rack two city blocks away, (113); that the boy
on the tractor saw the automobile as the tractor came
upon the highway, and at that time he estimated the
distance of the automobile from the tractor to be about
one-half mile (103). The clear distance at which the
tractor and hay-rack could have been seen by appellant
was from thirty-five one-hundreths to fifty-five onehundreths of a mile (71).
Third: There was no factor of high or dangerous
speed in the Turner case. The only evidence being that
the Defendant was driving 45 to 50 MPH, which was
apparently within the speed limit for the area concerned.
In the case now before the court the evidence shows
that the appellant was driving 70 ~IPH shortly before
the impact (112), that he did not reduce his speed upon
approaching the tractor and hay-rack, and that only at
the last possible moment did he swerve to attempt to
pass the hay-rack on the right (11±), and in doing so
the car struck the hay-rack, overturned and came to
rest on its top in the barrow pit son1e 235 feet down
the highway. It is subn1itted that the facts of the case
now before the court can be distinguished from the
facts of the Turner vs. Purdmn case in every important
particular.
Appellant suggests in his brief that perhaps he is
guilty only of momentary inattention. An examination
10
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j .

of the acts of the appellant shows that he was guilty
of a 'reckless disregard' of the safety of others. His
actions clearly show he was operating his automobile
exactly as he pleased, regardless of the consequences
to others. Such a course of action can hardly be called
'momentary inattention'.
In broad daylight an object as large as a hay-rack
and tractor came upon the highway when the appellant
was about two city blocks or approximately 1000 to
1200 feet away. The slow moving tractor and hay-rack,
which the evidence shows was moving at the speed of
4 to 5 MPH, had time to get fully upon the highway and
travel down the highway a distance of 80 feet and was
almost stopped at the time of impact. Meanwhile, appellant did nothing except to continue at full speed ahead,
then when he was almost on top of the hay-rack, he attempted to pass on the right and lost control of his
automobile. The evidence is without dispute, that even
at 70 MPH, including reaction time, appellant could
have brought his automobile to a complete stop within
a distance of 282 feet (172).
The evidence further shows that the distance travelled by the tractor from the point of its entry upon the
highway to the point where it was at the time of the
collision would be at least 83 feet, (Plaintiff's exhibit
D), and the tractor moving at a speed of 4 MPH would
take 13-5/6 seconds to cover the distance of 83 feet, or
if the tractor were moving at the speed of 5 MPH it
would take 10.8 seconds to cover the distance of 83 feet.
(The figures on the speed of the tractor are taken from
page 91 of the record.) Then taking into consideration
11
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the speed of the automobile at 70 MPH which equals
102 feet per second it is apparent that Defendant's
automobile must have been 1407 feet to the north of
the tractor when the tractor pulled onto the road if the
tractor were travelling 4 MPH; or 1101 feet to the
north of the tractor if the tractor were traveling 5 :MPH.
POINT II
IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE JURY OBEYED
THE INSTRUCTION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO
DISREGARD THE REMARKS TO WHICH APPELLANT TOOK EXCEPTION, AND IT WAS A PROPER
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETIOX FOR THE
TRIAL COURT TO DENY :MISTRIAL
The admonition of the court to the jury to disregard
the remarks complained of in respondent's opening statement protected the rights of the appellant, and it was a
proper exercise of judicial discretion for the trial court
to deny a mistrial.
The trial court admonished the jury to disregard
the remarks to which appellant had taken exception, and
directed the jury that the statement had no bearing on
the facts of the case and should not be regarded by
them in either their deliberations or in their adjudication
of the case. (Supplemental record page 6)
There is a presumption that the jury obeyed the
instructions of the court to disregard the objectionable
remarks. The rule is set out in 53 Am. Jur., Section
505, at page 407, as follows:
"Since in 1nany cases the effect of ilnproper argument can be rmnedied by an instruction to the

12
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jury to disregard it, the courts generally require
in order to predicate errors thereon, that an objection must be made at the time of the improper
statement, so that an opportunity may be given
to the attorney making the misstatement and the
court to rectify the damage. Dependant upon the
circumstances of the particular case, sometimes
the mere sustaining of an objection to the improper remark or the mere sustaining of an
objection together with an admonition to counsel,
would be sufficient to remove the injurious effect
thereof."
In the case of Potter vs Cave, 98 N. W. 589 (Iowa),
the court stated the rule as follows :

"It not infrequently happens that in opening
a case a counsel makes statements of an intention
to prove matters as to which the evidence is subsequently rejected by the court, and when the
statement is not unreasonable in itself, but is
made in good faith we would not hold that error
was committed even though the court should afterward properly exclude the evidence relied upon."
In the case of Y echout vs. Tesnohlidek, 150 N. W.
199, at page 200, the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted
the following rule:
"In making statements to the jury the plaintiff is entitled to 'briefly state his claim' and may
state the evidence by which he expects to sustain
it (Nebraska Code). In all cases, reasonable
latitude must be allowed in what the party 'expects' to prove. The fact that he may fail to
establish facts which he may have expected to
prove does not necessarily establish that the
statement was intentionally false. The incidents
referred to, even if not proved, were of a trivial

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

matter, not material to a recovery and we cannot
conceive any prejudice resulting therefrom."
The rule is stated in 88 C. J. S. at page 399, as follows:
" ... and whether an admonition to the jury
is sufficient to eradicate the prejudicial effect of
the misconduct is largely a n1atter within the
discretion of the trial court."
In the case of Baker 1.iS. The Market-Street Railway,
11 P. 2d 912, the California court, at page 915, quoted
the following rule from the previous California case of
Tingley vs. Times-Mirror, 89 Pac. 1097, 1106,
"It is only in extreme cases that the court,
when acting promptly and speaking clearly and
directly on the subject, cannot, by instructing the
jury to disregard such matters, correct the impropriety of the act of counsel and remove any
effect his conduct or remarks would otherwise
have."
It is submitted that the statenwnt 1nade by respondent's counsel in his opening statmnent, to the effect that
the parties purchased a six-pack beer, was not a remark
of such a character as to create an .. extrmne situation"
that was not readily cured by the ad1nonition of the
trial court to the jury that the jury should disregard
such remarks and not consider the1n in their deliberations. Respondent also points out that there was
never any subsequent reference 1nade to the subject
throughout the entire three day trial.
Further, respondent does not concede that a stateInent to the effect that the parties of the lawsuit
purchased a six-pack beer son1e four hours prior to the
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time of collision was a prejudicial statement, even
though respondent's complaint did not allege intoxication
on the part of the Appellant.
In the case of J ally vs. Clements, (Cal.) 82 P. 2d 51,
the court considered the question of evidence concerning the use of intoxicants by the defendant, where trial
court refused to submit the question of intoxication to
the jury in a special interrogatory, and, at page 56, the
court commented as follows :
"The extent to which appellant had been
drinking was a circumstance that the jury had a
right to consider in deciding whether a proper
lookout had been kept. There is no claim here
of appellant having been heavily intoxicated. If
the liquor had any effect on the attention which he
gave to the condition of the road in front of him,
or upon the keenness with which he observed it,
then the fact that he had taken the drinks was
still but one ingredient, among other ingredients,
such, as for example the natural weariness of a
person who had been without sleep until that
hour in the 1norning, that the jury may have believed to have affected the clarity of his observation and the keenness of his judgment at the time
of the accident."
A similar question came before the Colorado
Supreme Court in the case of Foster vs. Redding, 45 P.
2d 940, and the Court in ruling on the question, at page
942, stated as follows:

"It follows that the rulings on the instructions
concerning 'wilful and wanton disregard' as distinct from those elements involved in intoxication,
though technjcall~T erroneous had the sobriety of
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the driver been a question of doubt, are here
totally devoid of prejudice. It is therefore unnecessary to further examine these rulings
though we detect no error in them."
Counsel for the appellant, at the time the objection
was made to the court concerning the statement of respondent's counsel, asked the court that an explanation
be made thereof to the jury (Supplemental transcript
page 2). The court, in making the requested explanation
to the jury, embodied all of the remarks requested by
the counsel for the appellant, and it appears that counsel
for appellant is now in no position to contend that he
was entitled to a mistrial.
THE
MOTION
MOTION
DENIED

POINT III
APPELLANT'S ~IOTIOX TO DISJ\fiSS,
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT, AND
FOR A NEW TRIAL WERE PROPERLY
BY THE TRIAL COURT.

Appellant's l\Iotion to Dismiss and ~lotion for a
Directed Verdict, for purposes of the motions, admitted
the truth of the evidence before the court and jury, together with all fair, reasonable, and legitilnate inferences favorable to Respondent. The trial court, under
the circumstances, had to decide whether there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury, or stated in another
way, whether there was sufficient eYidence to sustain
a verdict in the event the jury should find in favor of
the Respondent.
The foregoing principles of law haYe been followed
by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Sielsen ·rs.
Hermanson, 109 Ut. 180, 166 P. ~d 536, where the court
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in reversing a directed verdict said, at page 537 :
"On a motion by defendant for a directed
verdict in his favor, the evidence must be viewed
in the light most favorable to plaintiff. As it is
often put, if the evidence is favorable to plaintiff,
with all reasonable inferences and intendments
that can be drawn therefrom could sustain a verdict for plaintiff the cause should be submitted
to the jury."
A consideration of the evidence and the reasonable
inferences therefrom, in the case now before the court,
certainly sustains the rulings of the trial court. A driver
who travels at a speed of 70 MPH, disregards the warnings and protests of a guest, strikes a hay-rack and
tractor in broad daylight, then careens down the road
into the barrow pit, overturns several times and comes
to rest 235 feet from the area of the impact, certainly
cannot seriously contend that such evidence, together
with the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, is insufficient to make out a prima facia case of
"reckless disregard for the rights of others".
In the case before the court the trial judge ruled
that the evidence offered in support of Respondent's
case was sufficient to allow the case to go to the jury;
and the jury, after hearing all the evidence, found in
favor of Respondent. The matter was again reviewed
by the trial judge on Appellant's motion for a new trial,
and after reconsidering all the evidence, as well as the
alleged errors of the court, the trial judge denied the
motion for a new trial permitting the jury's verdict to
stand.
Appellant courts have frequently laid down and ad-
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hered to the rule that wherever a verdict is supported
by substantial evidence it should be regarded as presumably correct, and strength is added to this rule where
the cas:e has been reviewed by the trial judge sitting in
effect as a ninth juror and denying the motion for a
new trial.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATIO~ WAS NOT A
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST AND NEED NOT BE
NAMED AS A PARTY PLAINTIFF.
Prior to the time of trial, Appellant made no motion
to have the Veterans Administration named as a party
plaintiff although Appellant was advised by Respondent's answer to Interrogatory No. 11, ·which was filed
on April 8, 1957, some eight months prior to trial, that
the hospital and medical expenses incurred by Respondent at the Veterans Hospital would be claimed as
a part of Respondent's damage (page 18 of Transcript
of Pleadings). Appellant's motion to include the Veterans Administration as an additional party plaintiff was
made on the second day of trial.
The court properly ruled as a n1atter of law that
the Veteran's Ad1ninistration was not a real party in
interest, and therefore could not properly be joined as
a party plaintiff. This ruling is supported by a decision
of the United States Supre1ne Court in the case of the
United States vs. Standard Oil Company, 332 U.S. 301,
67 Sup. Court 1604, 91 Law Ed. 206·7, where the United
States Supre1ne Court had before it a case in which
the United States was the plaintiff suing for its loss of
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I·.

services of a member of the Armed Forces, who sustained injuries in a traffic accident caused by the wrongful act of an employee of the Standard Oil Company.
The serviceman was unable to perform his duties for
29 days, and the Government instituted suit to recover
the wages paid to the soldier and the reasonable value
of the medical care furnished him in connection with
the treatment of his injuries. The Supreme Court held
that the matter of the Government being able to sue for
the damages resulting to it from a tortious injury to a
member of the Armed Forces was a matter of fiscal
policy. Since Congress had enacted no legislation providing the government with a right of action against
third persons whose wrongful acts cause injury to members of the Armed Forces resulting in damages to the
government, the court held that the government had no
right of action for such damages.
Based upon the foregoing case which is the leading
case on the subject, it is submited that there is no legal
basis upon which the Veterans Administration could
sue a wrongdoer for the value of services rendered to
a veteran, and it would have been error for the court
to have granted Appellant's motion to name the Veterans
Administration a party plaintiff.
POINT V
IT WAS ENTIRELY PROPER FOR THE TRIAL
COURT TO AD.MIT EVIDENCE RELATING TO
RESPONDENT'S OBLIGATION, IN THE EVENT
OF HIS RECOVERY FROM APPELLANT, TO PAY
THE VETERANS AD11INISTRATION FOR 1\IEDICAL SERVICE RENDERED HIM IN THE VETER-
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ANS HOSPITAL.
The Utah Supreme Court has followed the majority
rule which holds that the injured person may recover in
full from a wrong-doer regardless of anything that the
injured person may receive from a "collateral source"
unconnected with the wrong-doer. In the case of 1l1artin
vs. Sheffield, 112 Ut. 478, 189 P. 2d 127, the Court
adopted the following rule which is found at page 131:
"We therefore note another contention of
the appellant. He argues that plaintiff was not
entitled to recover for loss of wages during the
time she was disabled for the reason she was paid
by her employer for those particular days. The
undisputed evidence is that she obtained compensation by drawing on her accmnulative sickleave. In view of the fact that she lost the benefit of her sick-leave for future needs, under the
facts of this case, the Court did not misdirect the
jury on the issue of loss of incon1e during the
period she was unable to work."
The foregoing rule adopted by the Utah Supreme
Court is consistent with the rule set forth in the Restatement of Torts, Section 920, Subsection (e), at page
434, as follows:
"Where a person has been disabled and hence
cannot work but derives an incon1e during the
period of disability fr01n a contract of insurance
or fr01n a contract of e1nploy1nent which requires
pay1nent during such period, his inc01ne is not
the result of earnings but of previous contractual
arrangements made for his own benefit, not the
tortfeasor's. Likewise, the da1nages for loss of
earnings are not di1ninished by the fact that his
employer or a third person n1ade gifts to him
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even though these may have been given because
of his incapacity. Further, he may be able to
recover for the reasonable value of medical
treatment or other services made necessary by
the injury although these have been donated to
him."
The "collateral source" principle was examined exhaustively in the case of Hudson vs. Lazarus, 217 Fed.
2d 344, (1946). In that case, as in the case now before
the court, the injured party received treatment at a
Veterans' Hospital, but with this distinction-he did
not make any assignment of any portion of what he
might have been able to recover from a third party to
the Veterans Administration. At that time, the Veterans Administration's regulation under which the Respondent's obligation was concurred had not be adopted.
This fact is pointed out by the court in their opinion,
at page 34 7 note 11, in which the Veterans Administration Regulation, under which Respondent's assignment
was made, is discussed. The issue before the court in
the Hudson case was as follows:
In a personal injury action may the plaintiff
recover from the defendant tort-feasor the value
of all reasonable and necessary hospital services
furnished to the plaintiff without a charge by a
naval hospital because he was a Veteran' The
court held that the 'collateral source' principle
applied, and that recovery would be permitted
for the reasonable value of such hospital services
even though there was no obligation on the part
of the plaintiff to reimburse the Veterans Administration.
The court at page 347 stated as follows:
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"It is generally well settled that the fact that
the plaintiff may receive compensation from a
collateral source (or free medical care) is no defense to an action for damages against the person
causing the injury."
Citing Sainsbury vs.
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 4th Cir. (1950),
183 Fed. 2d 548, at page 550, 21 ALR. 2d 266.
In Plank vs. Summers, 203 ~Id. 552, 102 A. 2d 262,
which was cited by the court in Hudson vs. Lazarus, the
same rule applied where the court held: that in an
action against a civilian for injuries to members of the
Navy the value of medical and hospital services furnished
the plaintiffs gratuitously by the Federal Government
as a part of their compensation for services rendered
were proper items for the jury's consideration in determining the amount of damages to be paid the plaintiffs
by the defendant.
In the case of Caudill vs. rictory Carriers, Inc.,
(D. C. Va.) 149 Fed. Supp. 11, the court held that an
injured seamen was properly entitled to introduce evidence as to proper future 1nedical expenses even though
the injured sean1an was a member of the arn1ed forces
at the tin1e of injury and ·would be entitled to free treatment at a Veterans Hospital.
The most recent ruling on this subject \Yas decided
in ~Iarch, 1958, by the ±th Circuit of the U. S. Circuit
Court of Appeals in the rase of Rayfield rs. Lau-rence,
253 Fed. 2d 209. In this case the principal question before the court was the Defendant's cont~mtion that the
instruction to the effect that if the jury found the defendant liable it could consider, an1ong other elements
of dmnage, the fair and reasonable Yalue of the hospital
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and medical services rendered the plaintiff at the Naval
Hospital, even though the plaintiff may not have actually
expended any money for such hospital care and medical
services. The court, at page 212, held that the instruction was a corect statement of law, and at page 213, the
court stated the rule as follows:

"It is well settled in most jurisdictions, including Virginia where this accident occured,
that an injured person may recover in full from
a wrongdoer regardless of any compensation he
may receive from a collateral source."
In view of the law established by the cited cases as
well as by the Restatement of Torts to the effect that the
injured party may recover the value of the services
rendered by the Veterans Hospital, even though there
may be no obligation on his part to reimburse the Veter:
ans Administration, it certainly should be clear that the
court properly allowed evidence of R:espondent's obligation to pay the value of such services to the Veterans
Administration in the event of his recovery.
POINT VI
CONSIDERING THE PERI\fANENT NATURE
OF THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY RESPONDENT,
THE DAMAGES AWARDED ARE NOT EXCESSIVE, AND THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED
EVIDENCE OF ~rHE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION HOSPITAL BILL.

It is apparently appellant's contention as rais:ed in
his Point VI that it was error to permit the jury to
know that if Respondent recovered from Appellant he
was obligated to pay to the Veterans Administration
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the sum of $3300.75 for medical treatment rendered
the respondent at the Veterans Hospital in Salt Lake
City. Appellant does not deny that the treatment was
necesasry, or that it was rendered to the Respondent.
Appellant cites In re Behm's Estate, 117 Ut. 151,
213 P. 2d 657, (1950), as authority for the proposition
that Respondent cannot assign to the Veterans Administration a share of the proceeds he may recover
from a tortfeasor. It is submitted that the opinion in
the Behm case does not support such a proposition, but
on the contrary is authority in full support of the action
taken between the Respondent and the Veterans Administration as is shown in the following language of
the court, at page 662 :
"In the first cited case, (Richards vs. National
Transportation Co., 285 N. Y. 870), the injured
person assigned to a hospital a share of any proceeds he should acquire from any settlement or
judgment to be paid by the tortfeasor. The court
recognized that under the la'v of the State of
New York the cause of action was non-assignable,
but held that the assignment of a share of the
proceeds was enforceable in equity." (parenthesis
ours)
In the Behm case the following paragraph inunediately succeeds the quotation in Appellant's brief quoting
from page 663 of the case :
"Under the rules announced, the assignment
by the respondent of the proceeds, if any, that
should be recovered by the n1alpractice suit instituted by appellant, is valid and enforceable.''
"rhe agremnent made by respondent with the Yeter24
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ans Administration Hospital is contained in plaintiff's
Exhibit I, as follows:
"I, Gary R. Wood, in consideration of the
foregoing Reassignment, do hereby agree to reimburse the Veterans Administration from any
damages that may be recovered in any action or
settlement incident to the injuries for which hospital care and treatment was furnished, to the
extent of the total reasonable charges for such
hospital care, medical, surgical, clinical treatment
and other charges received by him, less the proportionate share of said Veterans Administration
for all costs, fees or other charges occasioned
thereof."
The only basis upon which appellant contends that
Respondent's damages are excessive is that the verdict
was influenced by the fact that the jury was advised
that Respondent was obligated to pay the Veterans Administration for the cost of his hospitalization in accordance with the agreement contained in plaintiff's Exhibit I.
Appellant avoids any reference to Respondent's injuries in making the contention that damages are excesive. The record shows Respondent was hospitalized
at :Montpelier, Idaho, from the date of injury on N ovem_:ber 3, 1956, to November 13, 1956, and at the Salt Lake
Veterans Hospital from November 13, 1956, until May
16, 1957, (plaintiff's Exhibit G.) Respondent had to pay
the Bear Lake Hospital $307.65 and his physician and
surgeon $192.35 (plaintiff's Exhibit E), in addition to
the amount which he agreed to pay the Veterans Administration in the event of his recovery.
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The medical evidence concerning the Respondent's
injuries shows that he sustained severe lacerations, beginning above the knee on the right leg, and extending
down through the bend of the knee and on to the extreme
right side of the leg (184, 185); that he had a permanent
injury to the peroneal nerve and the tibial nerve (183,
194); that the nerve injuries resulted in a 50% loss of
motor or muscle power in the right leg; that he has a
loss of sensation down the back part of the right leg,
over the heel and up the sole of the foot; that the ankle
was stiffened as a result of a loss of power, (195); and
that he had to undergo surgery, including skin grafts.
The attending surgeon stated, that in his opinion, Respondent had suffered a 50% loss of function of the
right leg, and that this was a permanent loss of function.
These injuries, together with this loss of bodily function,
were sustained by a young man 25 years of age. Certainly
it cannot be said that a verdict of $15,510.00 was excessive when $3810.75 of the verdict was for medical
expenses, nor can it be said that the jury was influenced
by passion or prejudice in awarding this an1ount to a
young man who had suffered the pain and disability of
such severe and permanent injuries.

POINT VII
POLICE OFFICER ALVI~ \Y. FOULGER \VAS
PROPERLY QUALIFIED AS ~\X EXPERT \YITNESS, AND HIS EXPERT TESTIMOXY \VAS
ENTIRELY :MATERIAL AND RELEYAXT TO THE
ISSUES OF THE CASE.
The 'evidence shows that Police Sergeant ~\lYin \V.
Foulger was qualified as an expert witness by Yirtue of
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his eight years experience as a traffic officer on the
Ogden City police force, by his specialized training at
three different safety and traffic schools conducted by
the National Safety Council, and further by his special
studies concerning the scientific basis for evaluating
speed on the basis of skid marks. (165) The California
Appellate court in the case of Wells Truckways vs.
Cebrian, 265 P. 2d 557, at page 564, states the rule that
has been adopted by practically all appellate courts
concerning the qualifications of a witness to testify as
an expert:
"The qualification of a witness to testify as
an expert is a matter within the sound discretion
of the trial court, and where there is no showing
of the clear abuse of that discretion, the ruling
of that court will not be disturbed upon appeal.
Where the witness has disclosed a sufficient
knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to
go to the jury the question of the degree of his
knowledge goes more to the weight of the evidence
than its admisibility." Citing People vs. Haeussler,
260 P. 2d 8; Pitt vs. Southern Pacific Company,
9 P. 2d 273; 10 Cal Jur. 963 sec. 220.
The Appellant objects to the denial of his motion
to strike Officer Foulger's testimony on the ground
that there was no evidence of brake marks at the scene
of the collision, and that for this reason there was no basis
for the answers of the officer to a hypothetical question
regarding the number of feet in which an automobile
could be brought to a stop from specified speed under
conditions similar to those faced by Appellant. Appellant,
apparently, misinterpreted the purpose of Officer
Foulger's testimony. The officer's testimony was not
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introduced for the purpose of proving any specific speed
on the part of the Appellant, but was introduced for the
purpose of estabishing that if Appellant had made any
attempt to stop when he saw, or could have seen the tractor and hay-rack coming onto the road, he would have
had ample time and distance in which to stop. The great
distance at which the tractor and hay-rack could have
been seen from the automobile at the time they came
upon the hard surface high,vay was testified to by
Miss Wright, who was riding in the front seat of
the automobile (113), and also by :\Ir. \Vallentine who
was riding on the tractor (103).
Appellant is bound by the well-established rule that
when the physical facts and circumstances are such that
he could, by looking, have seen the object of danger, it
cannot be said that he looked and did not see it. Under
such circumstances, it will be presumed that he either
failed to look or that he failed to take any heed to what
he saw.
All of the objections made by Appellant to Officer
Foulger's testimony are objections that go to the weight
of the testimony and have no bearing upon its adinisibility. The court, therefore, properly denied Defendant's
motion to strike this testimony.
POINT VIII
THE COURT'S INSTRFCTIOXS TO THE JURY
PROVIDED THE JURY \YITH A FAIR AXD
LEGALLY CORRECT BASIS FOR CONSIDERIKG
AND DELIBl~RATING UPON _.:\.LL ISSUES OF THE
CASE.
The general rule regarding the 1nanner in which an
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appellate court should evaluate the instructions of a
trial court is stated in 89 C. J. 8., Trial Sec. 430, at
page 11, as follows :
"Provided they are consistent with each other,
all instructions given in a case should be read
together as a whole, each in the light of the
others, and this rule with respect to the construction of instructions as a whole applies to
special charges given in the request of either
party. Accordingly, instructions are not subject
to exception where, when construed as a whole,
they properly state the law, and this is particularly true where the jury are told that all instructions
are to be considered as a series or as a whole."
(Italics ours)
The court's Instruction No. 31 specifically directed
the jury that all of the instructions, though numbered
separately, were to be considered as one connected whole,
and the jury was advised that they were not to single
out any one instruction and ignore the others.
It is submitted, that based upon the evidence, the
court properly denied Appellant's requests No. 1 and
No. 2 as these requests were an equivalent to a directed
verdict.
Appellant objects to the failure of the trial court
to give his request No. 6, but an examination of court's
Instruction No. 12 reveals that the court gave his request No. 6 verbatum with the sole exception that the
word, "misconduct", in the Appellant's request, was
replaced with the word, "disregard", by the court, in
order that the instruction would conform to the language of the Idaho Statute.
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· The court's instructions, construed as a whole, fairly
and completely present the matter to the jury, and they
contain all of the elements that should be considered
by the jury under the Idaho law. The fact that Appellant, in his brief, fails to specifically designate errors
in a single instruction, that he claims to be erroneous,
indicates that Appellant can find no error in the court's
charge to the jury.
CONCLUSION
The court properly submitted the case to the jury,
as the Respondent had proved every element necessary
to establish his cause of action under the Idaho Guest
Statute. The evidence on the n1anner in which the Appellant operated his automobile demonstrated clearly that
Appellant had a reckless disregard for the rights and
safety of the Respondent riding in his autmnobile.
The remainder of the Appellant's alleged errors
relate to matters that were within the judicial discretion
of the trial judge. In regard to these n1atters it is
submitted that the trial judge gave thoughtful and careful consideration to each of then1 and rendered his decision in accordance with the law.
We respectfully subn1it that the judg1nent should
be affirmed.
l(UXZ & l(UNZ
David S. I{unz
Attorneys for Rcspoudeut
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